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Abstract 
In recent years, the share of elderly in the total population is increasing around the world. 
Rising proportionally are claims on public pension systems and health care expenditures. 
This places extra pressure on government budgets. As a result, countries which implement 
only pay-as-you-go pensions face fiscal deficits. This paper examines Uzbekistan’s 
statutory pension system, which consists of two pillars: a public pay-as-you-go defined-
benefit pension scheme, and a mandatory public funded defined-contribution scheme. We 
focus in particular on the funded scheme and evaluate ways to improve it by considering 
the achievements of other developing and transitioning countries in similar positions. The 
analysis focuses on the choice of fund ownership, contribution rates, investment returns, the 
population coverage rate, and the feasibility of further reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, both developed and developing countries have experienced 
major changes in the structure of their populations. The fraction of elderly people in the 
total population has been in persistent rise. This process - often referred to as population 
aging - is more advanced in developed countries, but in recent years its effects are similarly 
being felt by developing countries. Among the many consequences of population aging, its 
fiscal effect has been recognized as the most immediate and destabilizing. 
As the share of the elderly in the total population increases, claims on public pension 
systems and the demand for health care expenditure similarly rise, placing extra pressure on 
government budgets. Such negative developments undermine the long-term sustainability 
of fiscal systems. International experience has shown that the destabilizing fiscal impact of 
population aging is particularly strong in the case of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) type public 
pension systems. Due to their specific design, in which current workers finance pension 
payments for current pensioners, these public pension systems are found to be the most 
vulnerable sections of government budgets. 
As a consequence, a large number of developed and developing countries have 
implemented comprehensive pension reforms. These aim to create multi-pillar pension 
systems, which are considered to be less vulnerable to the fiscal effects of population aging. 
Table 1 
Demographic Projections for Uzbekistan, 2005-2050 
 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total Population (millions) 26.6 28.6 32.5 35.3 37.5 38.6 
Total fertility rate 2.74 2.27 1.94 1.85 1.85 1.85 
Life Expectancy, Men 64 65.1 67.6 69.7 71.4 72.1 
Life Expectancy, Women 70.4 71.5 73.8 75.6 77.1 77.7 
% of Population Aged 60 + 6.2 6.2 8.7 12.3 15.8 21.1 
Source: United Nations (2005) 
       
Following this worldwide trend, in 2005, the government of Uzbekistan launched a major 
reform of the country’s pension system. It created a two pillar pension system, with its 
current PAYG-type pension system serving as the first pillar, and a new funded system as 
the second pillar. This pension reform was launched mainly to prepare the country’s 
pension system for the expected severe aging of the population. Based on United Nations 
demographic projections, Table 1 shows that the share of the elderly (aged 60 years and 
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older) could increase from 6.2 percent in 2004 to 21.1 percent in 2050 (United Nations, 
2005). The secondary reason for the introduction of the funded pillar was to increase the 
coverage of the pension system, by attracting those individuals working in the informal 
sector, who currently account for approximately half of the country’s total workforce 
(NHDR, 2005). 
Ganiev (2007) provides estimates of the impact of population aging on the financial state of 
the Uzbekistan’s PAYG pension scheme. His actuarial projections for the PAYG pension 
scheme indicate that it would be in deficit by 2020 due to decreases in the support ratio 
caused by the elderly population growing faster than the population of contributors. 
Moreover, the baseline predictions indicate that by 2080 the PAYG system in Uzbekistan 
could experience accumulated pension liabilities which are as high as 316 percent of GDP. 
The Uzbekistan reform of 2005 has been fueling debate among policymakers and 
academics since its introduction. Many worry about the future of both the funded pension 
scheme and the pension system as a whole. Some policymakers and academics have been 
calling for a drastic reform of the pension system based on successful pension reforms in 
neighboring Kazakhstan. This involves the replacement of the existing PAYG pension 
scheme with a more comprehensive funded pension scheme. Conversely, others have been 
calling for moderate reforms that will keep the both the PAYG and funded pillars, while 
allotting a greater role for the latter. Currently, the government does not yet have a clear 
idea of the pension system’s future. Consequently, the future of the funded pension scheme 
in particular and the pension system in general remains in doubt. 
This uncertainty raises a number of important questions about reform options. Should 
Uzbekistan follow the example set by neighboring Kazakhstan, and carry out a complete 
overhaul of the country’s pension system? If so, are there necessary conditions for the 
successful operation of a large-scale funded pension scheme? What are the current funded 
pillar’s main design flaws? In general, what role should the funded pillar play in the 
pension system? This paper aims to provide answers to these questions, by analyzing and 
utilizing the experience of developing countries in designing and running funded pension 
schemes. Taking into account Uzbekistan’s economic development, the study will focus on 
the experience of developing countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
republics. We will present an appropriate set of reform measures to improve Uzbekistan’s 
existing funded pillar and the pension system as a whole.  
We proceed as follows. Part 2 provides an overview of Uzbekistan’s current pension 
system in terms of its main parameters, legal framework and recent developments. Part 3 
presents background information on pension schemes in developing countries. Part 4 
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evaluates Uzbekistan’s existing funded pillar through the application of lessons drawn from 
other developing countries. Important issues include the choice of fund ownership, 
contribution rates, investment returns, the coverage rate, and feasibility of further reforms. 
Part 5 closes this study with conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2. The pension system of Uzbekistan – An overview 
Uzbekistan’s statutory pension system consists of two pillars: a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
defined-benefit pension scheme, and a mandatory funded defined-contribution scheme. 
Under current law, the PAYG scheme plays a dominant role in old-age income provision, 
accounting for most pensioner income. The funded pillar, on the other hand, is relatively 
small, thereby playing a negligible role. 
The PAYG pension scheme 
Uzbekistan inherited its current PAYG scheme from the Soviet Union after gaining 
independence in 1991. Until 2005, this was the country’s only pension scheme. Currently, 
the PAYG pillar provides pension income to about 2.8 million individuals, or about 10.4 
percent of the country’s population, which is much smaller than in Russia (27 percent), and 
many European countries (above 25 percent) (Islamov and Shadiev, 2003). The PAYG 
pillar provides three types of pensions: old-age pensions to 1.9 million individuals (67.0 
percent of the total); disability pensions to 0.6 million individuals (20.5 percent); and 
survivors’ pensions to 0.3 million individuals (12.5 percent). For men, the statutory 
retirement age is set at 60, and pension receipt requires 25 years of covered employment. 
Women can retire at age 55 with 20 years of covered employment.  
The current pension law also provides generous pension privileges in the form of early 
retirement schemes. These allow certain categories (both men and women) to retire 5 or 10 
years earlier than regular retirement ages. According to informal assessments conducted by 
the Ministry of Finance of Uzbekistan, at present, there about 800,000 early retirees in the 
pension system, who account for about 27 percent of all pensioners. In general, such early 
retirement privileges are awarded to individuals who have been occupied for full workdays 
in underground work, or with extra-harmful and extra-strenuous working conditions. These 
generous early retirement schemes further threaten the financial stability of the PAYG 
pension scheme by reducing the number of workers making contributions, and by 
increasing the number of retirees receiving pension benefits. 
From the revenue side, the PAYG pillar relies on three sources. Payroll contributions are 
made by employers with a tax rate of 23.5 percent (this provides about 77.0 percent of total 
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revenues), a 0.7 percent tax on the value of gross sales (goods and services) or gross 
revenue of businesses (14.2 percent of the revenues), and contributions made by employees 
with a tax rate of 2.5 percent. According to unpublished data from the Ministry of Finance 
of Uzbekistan, there are currently 4.7 million individuals actively contributing to the PAYG 
pillar, which accounts for about half of the country’s employed population. The other half 
of the employed population not contributing, mostly work in unofficial sectors of the 
economy. 
The funded pension scheme 
In 2005, the government of Uzbekistan launched a major reform of the country’s pension 
structure. The reform aimed to create a multi-pillar pension system, with the current PAYG 
pension scheme serving as the first pillar and a newly established funded scheme as the 
second pillar. A specific characteristic of the newly introduced funded pillar is that it is 
fully owned and managed by a state-owned commercial bank – the People’s Bank of 
Uzbekistan. In fact, the law, “On Cumulative Pension Provision for the Citizens of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan” approved by the parliament in 2004 specifically prohibits the 
establishment of privately-owned funded pension schemes. 
The law mandates participation of all active PAYG scheme contributors in the funded 
scheme, while the rest of the workforce (self-employed, farmers, and others) may 
participate on a voluntary basis. Currently, there are about 4.7 million individuals actively 
contributing to the funded pillar. Since this is about the same as the PAYG pillar, few 
individuals are participating in the funded pillar on a voluntary basis. 
At present, the contribution rate is set at only one percent of personal income. Contributions 
are automatically withheld and deposited in personal accounts. Extra contributions beyond 
the minimum one percent are allowed on a voluntary basis.  
Regarding investment options, the law stipulates that, for purposes of protecting the funds 
from inflation and increasing their real value, accumulated funds can be used to provide 
credit or to invest in financial instruments. The law further requires the People’s Bank to 
make investment decisions in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. 
Under the law, the People’s Bank is obliged to pay interest on accumulated funds at a rate 
that exceeds the inflation rate. The interest rate is determined by the People’s Bank, in 
coordination with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Contributions made by 
individuals to their personal accounts and interest income earned on those accumulated 
funds are exempt from taxation.  
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On the payment side, individuals gain access to their pension savings upon reaching the 
statutory retirement age. At that point, individuals may choose to receive benefits on a 
monthly basis over a fixed period, or withdraw the full amount at once. In case of the 
account holder’s death, the full amount of the accumulated funds is paid to his or her heirs. 
3. Background 
For the last three decades, a widespread shift to multi-pillar pension schemes that include 
advanced funding in both developed and developing countries has fuelled academic 
research on the optimal design of pension schemes. The main objectives of such research 
have been to identify shortcomings in existing funded schemes, explore common problems 
encountered by countries in designing and running the funded schemes, and ascertain best 
practices for them. 
Setting common ground are two World Bank reports, World Bank (1994) and Holzmann 
and Hinz (2005). World Bank (1994) defines three pillars as potential components of a 
country’s pension system, which has proved to provide a very useful framework. The 
original three-pillar concept was advocated by the Bank based on the notion that such a 
system would result in better financial security for the elderly. In such a system, the first 
pillar, a publicly-managed unfunded defined-benefit system with mandatory participation, 
would have the limited goal of reducing poverty among the elderly and redistributing 
income. The second pillar, a mandatory, fully-funded pension with defined contributions, 
would facilitate income-smoothing and accumulation of savings among all income groups. 
The third pillar, a voluntary savings system, would provide additional protection for 
individuals who want more income and insurance during their old age. However, this three 
pillar system often fails to provide universal old-age income security, particularly in 
developing countries where large portions of the work force are not covered by formal 
schemes.  
As such, Holzmann and Hinz (2005) extend the World Bank’s approach to include five 
pillars. The two additional pillars are a basic (zero) pillar, to address poverty alleviation 
more explicitly with a universal non-contributory pension, and a non-financial (fourth) 
pillar, to include the broader context of social protection policy, such as family support, 
access to health care, and housing. 
The other important change to the Bank’s perspective was the recognition that initial 
conditions must be taken into account in considering reform options. These include the 
setup of the inherited pension system, as well as the economic, institutional, financial, and 
political environment of a country. The Bank now recognizes that there is no universally 
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applicable prescription for reforming pension systems. Some pension systems function 
effectively with a zero pillar (in the form of a universal social pension) plus a third pillar of 
voluntary savings. The political economy of other countries, on the other hand, allows 
operation of first-pillar public pension system along with voluntary savings schemes. 
Pension reforms must be country-specific. 
Beyond defining the pension pillars, the World Bank also describes essential goals for any 
pension system. These include, first, the provision of adequate retirement income. This 
involves the provision of benefits to the elderly at levels that are sufficient to prevent old-
age poverty, in addition to providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for 
the majority of the population. Second, it is essential to provide a retirement income within 
the financing capacity of individuals, thereby avoiding fiscal burden on the society, and 
which is sustainable over a long period of time. Finally, retirement incomes must be robust, 
as a pension system needs to be able to withstand major economic, demographic and 
political volatility shocks. Meeting these goals also requires that the pension system 
contributes to economic growth and development, since pension benefits represent claims 
against future economic output. This requires increasing the level of national savings and 
developing the country’s financial markets. 
By observing the experience of its client countries in providing old-age income security, the 
Bank also concludes that multi-pillar pension schemes are better-suited for achieving the 
discussed set of goals. Holzmann and Hinz (2005) confirm that most PAYG-type pension 
systems fail to provide an adequate level of old-age income and are financially 
unsustainable. However, the Bank also recognizes that not all countries are ready to 
introduce and successfully operate a funded pillar. The report also stresses that the 
introduction of a funded pillar does not require perfect conditions, namely the existence of 
fully-functioning financial and capital markets. Instead, funded pillars should be introduced 
gradually, to enable them to facilitate financial market development. Some minimum 
necessary conditions for a funded pillar include the existence of a core of stable banks and 
other financial institutions capable of offering reliable administrative and asset management 
services, long-term government commitment to pursue sound macroeconomic policies and 
related financial sector reforms, and commitment to establishing a sound regulatory 
framework. 
The pension reform experiences of developing countries in Latin America, Europe and 
Central Asia are of particular interest to this study, as a number of those developing 
countries have socio-economic conditions similar to Uzbekistan. Regarding the pension 
reforms in Latin America, Holzmann and Hinz (2005) note that as of the first half of 2004, 
ten Latin American countries had introduced mandatory funded pillars to accompany 
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PAYG systems of various sizes. As a part of reform, these countries were also tending to 
unify their fragmented pension systems and expand coverage to the whole formal labor 
market.  
These reforms were substantially improving fiscal sustainability while maintaining an 
adequate level of projected benefits. According to the World Bank’s simulations, after a 
short period of increases in deficit levels, the reformed pension systems had much lower 
deficits. In Bolivia and Mexico, for example, deficits projected for the year 2050 will 
decrease from 8.5 percent and 2.3 percent of GDP without reform to 0.9 percent and 0.6 
percent with reform, respectively. The Bank subsequently warns that during the transition 
period, higher deficits can make fiscal management exceedingly difficult, and stresses the 
need for an extended period of preparation prior to the introduction of the funded pillar. 
This had been a critical factor in Chile’s famous success with its implementation of a 
funded pension pillar.  
As for the robustness of the reformed systems, the Bank calls attention to lessons learned 
from Argentina during its economic crisis in 2001-2002. Argentina’s experience showed 
that funded pillars with portfolios highly concentrated in government securities may 
collapse in times of economic crisis that lead to government insolvency. Buying 
government debt with a funded pillar does not diversify risks, and the funded pension still 
relies on the domestic government’s solvency, implying that pension systems as a whole do 
not take advantage of a multi-pillar structure’s main benefits. 
Reviewing the pension reforms in Europe and Central Asia, the World Bank in Holzmann 
and Hinz (2005) divided countries into two groups. The first group consisted of countries 
such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan, which did not introduce 
funded pillars to their pension systems, owing to a lack of financial resources. Bolder 
reforms undertaken by the second group of ten countries, conversely, resulted in the 
introduction of funded pillars. This group included Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Russia, Kazakhstan, Croatia and Kosovo. Multi-pillar reforms in this region were 
similar, but less radical, to those in Latin America; the pension systems of eight of the 
above-listed countries were still dominated by the PAYG pillar, while only Kazakhstan and 
Kosovo had pension systems dominated by the funded pillar. 
As a neighboring country of Uzbekistan, it is especially worthwhile to consider the pension 
reform in Kazakhstan, as among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has been the pioneer 
of multi-pillar reforms. In 1998, Kazakhstan carried out radical pension reforms, effectively 
replacing the country’s old PAYG pension scheme with a funded pension system. Andrews 
(2001) provides a comprehensive review of the multi-pillar reforms in Kazakhstan. 
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Discussing the motives behind the reforms, Andrews notes that the main impetus was the 
deteriorating financial state of the country’s PAYG system, which had a relatively low 
worker-to-pensioner ratio and a large stock of accumulated pension liabilities. The shift to a 
funded pension system was carried out to send a strong signal to the population that 
individuals, instead of the government, would hence be responsible for their old-age 
income security. Additionally, the shift was meant to reduce government expenditures, 
encourage private savings, and promote capital market development.  
Kazakhstan adopted an approach similar to Chile. But their reform differed from those in 
Chile and other transition countries because it provided full coverage to all workers, 
regardless of age. The specific feature of the reforms in Kazakhstan was that under the new 
system, accrued entitlements from the old PAYG systems were maintained. These are 
financed by a 15 percent payroll tax, compared with the prior 25.5 percent. However, the 
payroll tax is expected to be reduced further, as payment of accrued PAYG entitlements 
decline. 
Describing the specific features of the new funded pension system, Andrews notes that 
several institutions have played crucial roles in the operation of the new system. These 
include, first, private pension and state accumulation funds, whose primary responsibilities 
are to collect contributions, administer contributors’ accounts, and calculate and pay 
benefits. Each fund is limited to one contract per asset management company. Second, asset 
management companies, whose primary responsibility is to provide investment services for 
pension funds. Finally, custodian banks, who are to ensure the appropriate use of finances 
by pension funds and asset management companies. Each fund keeps the accumulated 
assets of fund contributors with one authorized custodian bank. Andrews (2001) indicates 
that the incorporation of these three actors is meant to ensure the provision of transparent 
investment services by pension funds and asset management companies, based on fraud- 
and abuse-free business practices. 
Andrews also notes that despite satisfactory reform progress in Kazakhstan, additional 
measures are needed to achieve the original reform goals, particularly in the areas of 
portfolio diversification, regulation, and benefit levels. As in many developing countries, 
the investment portfolio of Kazakhstan’s funded system is composed mainly of government 
securities, with more than 90 percent of funds invested in Eurobonds. Such a portfolio 
composition, according to the study, explained high rates of return on investments. 
However, the author claimed that such a heavy reliance on foreign currency-denominated 
securities does not contribute to the growth of the local economy in the long run, a major 
shortcoming of the country’s funded pension system. Also, the current regulatory setup 
does not guarantee the absence of interlocking financial interests between different types of 
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players in the system (pension funds, management companies, and custodian banks). This 
shortcoming in the regulatory base created opportunities to abuse the contributions system. 
The contribution rate should also be increased (from the current 10 percent of earnings) to 
achieve the targeted 60 percent replacement rate. As the stock market develops, the share of 
government securities in the investment portfolios will shrink, and fluctuations in rates of 
return will increase, owing to the volatility of equities. Consequently, more contributions 
may be needed to maintain the targeted replacement rate. 
Overall, in Kazakhstan, there is a steady increase in the public’s confidence for private 
pension funds. The state pension fund was initially offered as an alternative to private funds, 
with the majority of workers choosing private funds that provide greater portfolio 
diversification and higher rates of return. However, in the early years of the reform, the 
state pension fund accounted for more than 70 percent of the pension system’s total assets. 
This was due to widespread distrust in the private sector. Workers believed that their 
savings were safer with state pension funds, as the contributions were guaranteed by the 
government. By October 2000, however, the share of the state pension fund fell to 42 
percent, suggesting the perceived superiority of private over state funds. 
4. Evaluation of the existing funded pillar in Uzbekistan 
The evaluation of the current funded pillar in Uzbekistan will be carried out for four key 
issues, the choice on ownership of funds, contribution rates and investment returns, the 
coverage rate, and the feasibility of further reforms. 
Ownership of funds (public vs. private) 
In contrast to Uzbekistan, almost the all countries reviewed in the preceding section have 
funded pension systems that rely heavily on private sector participation. Chile, Argentina, 
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Canada and Mexico in the Americas, and Sweden, 
Hungary, Poland, Macedonia, Latvia in Central and Eastern Europe are among those 
countries. In neighboring Kazakhstan, about two dozen private pension funds are currently 
functioning alongside a publicly-owned funded scheme. 
This clear preference toward private ownership of funded pension schemes raises the 
important question of whether sole public ownership and management of Uzbekistan’s 
funded pillar pension system is justifiable. To consider this, public and private funded 
pension schemes are often compared on the issues of operational/administrative costs, and 
on political risks and the rate of return on investments. 
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International experience in running funded pension schemes has shown that private pension 
funds are far more costly to manage than a single government fund. The average 
administrative cost of existing funded systems exceeds 5 percent of annual contributions, 
compared to 0.7 percent in case of the United States’ Social Security System (Baker and 
Kar, 2003). According to Queisser (1998) and Baker and Kar (2003), the main cause of the 
high operating costs in such systems is the frequent transfer of members’ accounts between 
the different fund management companies. Queisser (1998) reports that 50 percent of all 
contributors switched fund management companies in Chile annually, while 30 percent did 
so in Argentina. In Peru, where switching was initially prohibited, the number of transfers 
is now rising rapidly as well. 
In these countries, the principle of free choice was supposed to foster stiff competition 
between the fund management companies, resulting in the provision of the highest quality 
of services at the lowest prices for participants. Instead, the mechanism produced excessive 
competition through extensive marketing and advertisement campaigns, which in turn 
increased operation costs substantially. 
According to Queisser (1998), two factors reportedly have strong influence on the decision-
making of funded scheme participants. The first factor is the very high degree of similarity 
in investment behavior among competing fund management companies, which translates 
into nearly identical investment portfolios. The other factor is the strong tendency among 
participants to choose their fund management companies based on advertising campaigns, 
promotional gifts, and cash payments, as well as peer advice. 
Countries are finding ways to address the high funded private pension system operating 
costs. A number of proposals have been made so far to reduce operating costs. Among the 
most popular measures proposed and implemented include limiting the number of account 
switches per year (Mexico), allowing more than one account per worker to reduce the 
competition for accounts, and allowing fund management companies to charge exit fees 
(Peru) to discourage excessive account switching (Queisser, 1998). These measures, if 
implemented, can lower the operation costs of funded private pension systems, making 
them more feasible, both financially and politically. 
It is obvious that the causes of high operating costs of private funds can be easily avoided 
by setting up a funded pension system with a single publicly-owned scheme such as that in 
Uzbekistan. However, sole public ownership over the funded pension system has its own 
shortcomings and problems. One of the major shortcomings of publicly-owned funded 
systems is that they are highly vulnerable to political interference. Political factors can 
certainly affect the composition of public pension fund investment portfolios, with most of 
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the funds being invested in government bonds or in unproductive and infeasible public 
projects. As a result of such political risks, publicly managed pension funds often earn 
lower rates of return on their investments than privately managed funds. Iglesias and 
Palacios (2000) find that most public pension funds in developing countries had negative 
real returns on their investments. Moreover, in a number of countries in Latin America, 
Asia, and even in Europe, public pension funds were depleted through misuse and 
corruption, making the originally promised benefits impossible to deliver. These findings 
show that political risks in the case of publicly managed funded pension systems are real. 
Private funded pension schemes, on the other hand, are considered to be less susceptible to 
political interference. This is one of the main arguments of the World Bank’s pension 
reform policy (World Bank, 1994). Proponents of private ownership over funded pension 
systems, including the World Bank, argue that private ownership ensures a higher rate of 
return on investments, with a reasonable level of investment risk, provided the governments 
impose strict rules on the types of investment instruments that are appropriate for these 
funds. Common rules include prohibitions of investments in complex and speculative 
financial instruments, and investments only in equities that meet certain criteria (being 
listed on the stock exchange, or stocks of a certain grade, etc.). 
Contribution Rates and Investment Returns  
In Uzbekistan, individuals are only required to contribute one percent of their incomes to 
the funded pension. Table 2 provides a simple simulation to show the inadequacy of such a 
small contribution rate. The table considers the accumulated savings of a worker earning 
the average wage throughout their career in order to show how these savings will compare 
to earnings upon retirement. For purposes of making the table, we assume that real wages 
grow at 2 percent, while pension assets enjoy an average real return of 4.5 percent, meaning 
also that pension assets grow faster than real wages. These assumptions should be thought 
of as optimistic, as they imply much better economic and pension performance than has 
been possible with many developing country pension funds, but the results nonetheless 
show how small pensions will be. The nest egg ratio presents the total accumulated pension 
assets as a percentage of the real wage at different points in one’s career. From the 
simulation, we can see that even with these generous assumptions, a worker who 
contributes only one percent of their income over a career lasting 40 years will have total 
pension assets that match only 66.7 percent of their final salary. Various rules of thumb are 
available for how to spend down one’s assets if annuities are not available, and for example, 
if the retiree plans to spend 5 percent of their accumulated assets in each year of retirement, 
this would imply a pension replacement rate of only 3.3 percent, which is much too small 
to help fund retirements. 
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Table 2 
Projected Pension Savings From the Uzbekistan Funded Pension System  
For an Average Wage Male Worker, 2008-2047 
Year 
Length of 
covered 
employment 
Real Annual 
Wage 
(base=2008) 
Contribution 
rate (as 
percent of 
payroll) 
Annual 
contri-
butions 
Real 
Accumulated 
Pension 
Savings 
(base=2008) 
Nest Egg 
Ratio 
2008 1 2,280 1 22.8 22.8 1.0% 
2009 2 2,326 1 23.3 47.1 2.0% 
2010 3 2,372 1 23.7 72.9 3.1% 
2011 4 2,420 1 24.2 100.4 4.1% 
2012 5 2,468 1 24.7 129.6 5.3% 
2013 6 2,517 1 25.2 160.6 6.4% 
2014 7 2,568 1 25.7 193.5 7.5% 
2015 8 2,619 1 26.2 228.4 8.7% 
2016 9 2,671 1 26.7 265.4 9.9% 
2017 10 2,725 1 27.2 304.6 11.2% 
       2022 15 3,008 1 30.1 537.5 17.9% 
       2027 20 3,322 1 33.2 844.3 25.4% 
       2032 25 3,667 1 36.7 1244.7 33.9% 
       2037 30 4,049 1 40.5 1763.8 43.6% 
       2042 35 4,470 1 44.7 2432.7 54.4% 
       2047 40 4,936 1 49.4 3290.8 66.7% 
Note: Other Assumptions: Real Income growth = 2 percent; Real investment returns = 4.5 percent. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The above simulations imply that the funded pension system will play a very small role in 
financing elderly retirements. In fact, Uzbekistan’s funded pension scheme has the smallest 
contribution rate among those currently in operation worldwide. For instance, in Chile, 
Colombia, Bolivia and El-Salvador, the contribution rate is set at 10 percent of payroll, 
while in Uruguay it is 12.27 percent, 12.07 percent in Mexico, 8 percent in Peru, and in 
Argentina it is 7.72 percent of payroll. Among Eastern European countries, the contribution 
rate in 7.2 percent in Poland, 6 percent in Hungary, and 5 percent in Croatia. In Kazakhstan, 
individuals contribute 15 percent of their income to their personal accounts. 
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To further consider the expected returns on pension assets in Uzbekistan, the present law 
obliges the People’s Bank to pay interest on accumulated funds at a rate that exceeds the 
inflation rate. This requirement sends a positive message about the funded pension scheme, 
as it implies that pension savings are protected against inflation. However, in reality there is 
a big difference between the interest rate stipulated in the law and the actual level. The 
problem lies with how the government measures inflation. There are two main indicators of 
inflation, namely changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and changes in the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) deflator. 
Normally, these two indicators nearly match in terms of magnitude. However, in 
Uzbekistan, the official CPI is normally much lower than the GDP deflator. For instance, in 
2007, the GDP deflator was 24.0 percent, while the CPI was only 6.8 percent. In 
Uzbekistan, the government reports the inflation rate based on the CPI. Since this CPI 
serves as the base for determining the interest rate paid on pension savings, individuals’ 
pension savings will lose their real value over time to the extent that the CPI understates 
actual price changes. 
Another important issue associated with investment returns is the asset allocation of the 
pension fund portfolio. Currently, the People’s Bank is allowed to invest pension funds 
only in domestic financial instruments such as government bonds, corporate bonds and 
deposits at commercial banks. Regarding the diversification of the investment portfolio of a 
funded pension scheme, Pfau (2007) argues for broader investment of Pakistan’s pension 
portfolio into equities and international assets with simulations showing how such 
diversification leads to improvement in the long-term sustainability of the pension scheme. 
Only allowing investment in domestic fixed income securities exposes pension fund assets 
to too many idiosyncratic risks and also leads Uzbekistan workers to endure a high 
correlation between the general health of their economy and their retirement savings. 
Coverage rate 
As noted previously, the country’s funded pension schemes currently serves about 4.7 
million individuals, practically the same number served by the PAYG pillar. This implies 
that despite the openness of the funded pillar to voluntary participation of individuals 
engaged in the informal sector (which make up about half of the economically active 
population), almost all individuals engaged in the informal sector do not participate in the 
funded pension system. A similar situation has been observed in the majority of Latin 
American countries, where the rate of coverage was less than 50 percent of the 
economically active population. 
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One reason for the low participation may be common mistrust in the state-owned People’s 
Bank, and in the government’s commitment to provide safe handling of the pension savings. 
In fact, the People’s Bank is not among the country’s top banking institutions. Although the 
public’s confidence in the banking system and the government is rising, apparently it has 
not reached a sufficiently high level. 
The low level of participation in the funded pillar is also associated with a substantial gap 
between interest rates paid on bank deposits and interest paid by the People’s Bank on 
pension savings. In 2007, the average annual interest rate on bank deposits amounted to 
27.0 percent, while on pension savings the interest rate was based on CPI (6.8 percent). 
Such a considerable gap between rates clearly discourages voluntary deposits to the pension 
accounts in favor of deposits in commercial banks. In fact, according to informal data from 
the Ministry of Finance of Uzbekistan, the total sum of deposits made by individuals to 
commercial banks in 2007 increased by 53 percent, while the total sum of pension savings 
at the People’s Bank increased by only 31 percent. 
Feasibility of Further Expansion for the Funded Pension Scheme 
Uzbekistan’s existing funded pension scheme in its current setup is relatively small and 
provides negligible old-age income to those who participate in the current multi-pillar 
pension system. Moreover, the funded pension scheme is too small to produce significant 
amounts of additional savings for the national economy and to contribute to the economic 
development of the country. These facts raise important questions regarding the future of 
the funded pension scheme. Is it feasible to expand the current funded pillar? Does 
Uzbekistan have the necessary conditions that made similar reforms feasible in other 
developing countries? 
In the process of reviewing the existing literature on the experience of developing countries 
in designing and running funded pension schemes, one finds a set of minimum conditions 
that need to be satisfied for the successful operation of a funded pillar. These include the 
existence of a core of sound banks and other financial institutions capable of offering 
reliable administrative and asset management services, a long-term commitment on the part 
of the government to pursue sound macroeconomic policies and related financial sector 
reforms, and the establishment of core regulatory and supervisory systems required for the 
operation of funded pension schemes, as well as long-term commitment for the support and 
continued development of a sound regulatory framework. 
The banking sector of Uzbekistan is small by international standards, and the level of 
monetization and intermediation has been declining over the past several years. The ratio of 
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broad money to GDP declined from 17.7 percent in 1995 to 10.3 percent in 2006 (ADB, 
2007a). Despite its small size, the banking sector dominates the country’s financial sector 
as other types of financial institutions such as credit unions and insurance companies are 
relatively new and their share in financial sector’s total operations is insignificant. 
At present, Uzbekistan has a two-tier banking system, consisting of the Central Bank and 
32 commercial banks. Three of the commercial banks are fully state-owned, namely the 
National Bank of Uzbekistan (NBU), the Asaka Bank, and the People’s Bank. The rest of 
the banking sector consists of 5 joint-venture and subsidiary banks with foreign 
participation, 13 non-state-owned joint-stock commercial banks, and 11 private banks 
where private individuals own more than 51 percent of the charter capital. The presence of 
a large number of banks in the banking sector is a sign of high degree of competition in the 
market. However, closer analysis of the market by ownership structure reveals that the 
above information on the competitiveness of the market is misleading. The reason is that 
the country’s commercial banking sector is dominated by the state-owned banks, where 
NBU and Asaka Bank account for about 70 percent of the total assets of the banking system 
(EBRD, 2005). As both these banks are fully state-owned, the overwhelming share of 
banks’ activities remains under the government control. 
In terms of efficiency, which is defined as the ability of the banking sector to provide high 
quality financial products and services at the lowest cost, the situation in the banking sector 
has been deteriorating over the past few years. In recent years, the nominal deposit and 
lending rates structure underwent little change, with the interest rates staying above the 30 
percent level, despite the decline in the Central Bank’s refinance rate from 40 percent in 
1997 to 14 percent in 2007, and a decline in the GDP deflator from 66.1 percent in 1997 to 
24 percent in 2007 (NHDR, 2005; ADB, 2007b). Although the average spread between 
deposit and lending rates has been broadly stable since 2000, the interest rate structure, 
which is the cost of banking sector products, has not been adjusted yet for the recent 
economic developments, making the banking sector operations less efficient. 
Regarding the core regulatory and supervisory systems, during the last ten years there has 
not been any case of a bank collapse or bank run. Moreover, the number of commercial 
banks is increasing annually. However, the number of such entries is very small due to 
strict regulations and requirements for starting banks. All the above facts imply that in 
Uzbekistan core regulatory and supervisory systems are in place and functioning effectively. 
It should be possible to expand the funded pension scheme. 
5. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
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This study has considered the international experience with funded pension schemes and 
compared it to the situation in Uzbekistan. The evaluation of the current funded pillar has 
produced the following main findings and policy recommendations. 
First of all, the current policy choice of prohibiting the participation of the private sector in 
running the funded pension scheme is counterproductive, with its disadvantages 
outweighing its advantages. Private systems are found to be more costly to manage than 
public systems, but are less vulnerable to political interference and provide higher returns 
on investments. At the same time, private systems might be associated with higher 
investment risks than public ones. However, these shortcomings can be addressed by 
imposing appropriate regulations that prevent excessive competition among fund 
management companies (limiting the number of account switches per year, allowing more 
than one account per worker and allowing fund management companies to charge exit fees). 
Similarly, imposing strict rules on the investment of funds can prevent excessive risk-
taking among fund management companies, though the restrictions should not prohibit the 
inclusion of various diverse asset classes. Participation of the private sector in running the 
country’s funded pension scheme should be allowed and encouraged. 
Another important finding is that the current funded pension scheme is too limited. Its 
contribution rate is one percent of payroll, which happens to be the world’s smallest 
contribution rate. It is insufficient to provide an adequate level of additional pension 
income to that received from the PAYG pillar. At such rates, individuals will not be able to 
accumulate pension savings sufficient for their retirement years. The current funded 
pension scheme should be expanded, with a substantial increase in the contribution rate. 
Moreover, the current setup of the funded pillar offers negative real returns on pension 
savings, as it bases its interest payments on the CPI, which in Uzbekistan is a downward 
biased measure of inflation. This means that an individual’s pension savings will lose 
purchasing power over time. The method of interest rate determination should be modified, 
in order to ensure positive real rates of return on pension savings, in part by incorporating a 
wider range of assets into the investment portfolio. 
This study also reveals that multi-pillar pension reforms have failed to expand the coverage 
rate of the pension system. Despite low contribution rates and openness of the funded pillar 
for voluntary participation from those engaged in the informal sector of the economy, 
currently only those participating in the PAYG pension are the ones involved with the 
funded pension. This implies that nearly half of the economically active population, or 
almost all individuals engaged in the economy’s informal sector, do not participate in the 
funded pension system. Moreover, due to a substantial interest rate gap, individuals earn 
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more by depositing their savings in commercial banks rather than in the pension fund, 
which pays less than a quarter of what commercial banks pay for deposits.  
The last important finding of this study is that present conditions in Uzbekistan allow for 
further expansion of the funded pillar. Although the banking sector is dominated by state-
owned banks, which allows the government to exercise strict control, and is 
underdeveloped by international standards, it is nevertheless solid, and offers relatively 
reliable administrative and asset management services. Moreover, the core regulatory and 
supervisory systems are in place, and the Central Bank is executing supervision over the 
banking sector effectively. This has produced a stable banking system, which has not 
experienced any bank collapse or bank run during its comparatively short period of history. 
More can still be done to further liberalize the banking sector though, in order to reduce 
government control and raise public confidence. 
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